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IMPROVED CRYPTOANALYSIS OF THE SELF-SHRINKING 
P-ADIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC GENERATOR
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Abstract: The Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator (SSPCG) is a fast software stream cipher. Improved 
cryptoanalysis of the SSPCG is introduced. This cryptoanalysis makes more precise the length of the period of  
the generator. The linear complexity and the cryptography resistance against most recently used attacks are  
invesigated. Then we discuss how such attacks can be avoided. The results show that the sequence generated  
by a SSPCG has  a large period, large linear complexity and is stable against the cryptographic attacks. This 
gives  the  reason to consider  the SSPSG as  suitable  for  critical  cryptographic  applications  in  stream cipher  
encryption algorithms.
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Introduction
Stream ciphers have several properties that make them suitable for use in telecommunication applications. But 
apart from the security tried to obtain, the main property that makes stream ciphers distinguishable from block 
ciphers is that they are in general fast and have low hardware complexity. Stream ciphers process the plaintext 
character by character, so no buffering is required to accumulate a full plaintext block.
Most stream ciphers are based on simple devices that are easy to implement and run efficiently. A common 
example of such a device is the linear feedback shift register (LFSR). Such simple devices produce predictable 
output given some previous output. This is due to the linear property of the device. Therefore, in order to use 
LFSRs in cryptographical primitive, and particularly in a stream cipher, the linearity must be destroyed [Yilmaz, 
2004]. Unfortunately, the classical fast and cheap LFSRs are vulnerable to the so-named “Berlekamp-Massey 
crypto attack” [Lidl, Niederreiter, 1983], [Oorshot, Menezes, Vanstone, 1997], [Schneier, 1996].
Having in mind the advantages of the stream ciphers with simple structure, recently some theorists have used 
new approach of stream cipher design and have proposed a few new architectures named Shrinking generator 
[Coppersmith, Krawczyk, Mansour, 1994] and Self-Shrinking generator [Meier, Staffelbach, 1998]. With regard to 
positive features of the two generators and Feedback with Carry Shift  Registers (FCSRs) [Klapper, Goresky, 
1994], [Xu, 2000] the SSPCG [Tasheva, 2005], [Tasheva, Bedzhev, 2005], [Tasheva, Bedzhev, Stoyanov, 2005] 
have created. The results show that the SSPCG is a promising candidate for high-speed encryption applications 
due to its simplicity and provable properties.
In this paper, the SSPCG is further investigated with main focus on the period, linear complexity and resistance 
against the recently used cryptographic attacks. The improved cryptoanalysis shows SSPCG suitable for critical 
cryptographic applications.
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Description of the Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator
In contrast with the classic Self-Shrinking generator the SSPCG architecture (Fig. 1) uses a p-adic FCSR instead 
of LFSR. This allows the generator to produce a number in the range 0 to p−1 (p-its) in one step (ai = [0, 1, …, p
−1]). TheSSPCG selects a portion of the output p-adic FCSR sequence by controlling of the p-adic FCSR itself 
using the following algorithm:
Fig. 1 Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator
Definition 1: The algorithm of the Self-Shrinking p-adic Generator (Fig. 1) consists of the following steps:
1. The p-adic FCSR R is clocked with clock sequence with period 0τ .
2. If the p-adic FCSR output number is not equal to 0 (ai ≠ 0), the output bit forms a part of the p-adic SSPCG 
sequence. Otherwise, if the output number of the p-adic FCSR is equal to 0 (ai = 0), the p-adic output number of 
SSPG is discarded.
3. The shrunken p-adic SSPG output sequence is transformed in 2-adic sequence in which every p-adic number 
is presented with  )1(log2 −p  binary digits, where  x  is the smallest integer which is greater or equal to x. 
Every output  number  i  from 1 to p−1 of  p-adic  SSPCG sequence is  depicted  with  p−adic expansion  of  the 
number:
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The SSPCG uses the generalization of 2-adic FCSRs with stage contents and feedback coefficients  in Z/(p) 
where p is a prime number, not necessarily 2.
Definition 2: A p-adic feedback with carry shift register with Galois architecture of length L (Fig. 2) consists of L 
stages (or delay elements) numbered 0, 1, …, L-1, each capable to store one p-adic (0, 1, …, p-1) number and 
having one input and one output; and a clock which controls the movement of data. During each clock cycle the 
following operations are performed:
1. The content of stage 0 is output and forms part of the output sequence;
2. The sum modulo p after stage i is passed to stage i - 1 for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ L−1;
3. The output of the last stage 0 is introduced into each of the tapped cells simultaneously, where it is fully added 
(with carry) to the contents of the preceding stages.
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Fig. 2 Galois FCSR
The q1, q2, …, qL are the feedback multipliers and the cells denoted with c1, c2, …, cL−1 are the memory (or carry) 
bits.  If  q = -1+q1p + q2p2 +...+ qLpL is  the base p expansion  of  a  positive  integer  q ≡ -1 (mod p),  then q is  a 
connection integer for a FCSR with feedback coefficients q1, q2, …, qL in Z/(p).
With each clock cycle, the integer sums jjjj cqaa ++= 0σ  is accumulated. At the next clock cycle this sum 
modulo p  )(mod' 1 pa nj σ=−  is passed on the next stage in the register, and the new memory values are 
)(' 1 pdivc nj σ=− .
The nonlinearity of the proposed SSPG follows from the fact that it is unknown at which positions the FCSR 
sequence is shrunken. As a result the linear algebraic structure of the original FCSR sequence is destroyed. The 
software  SSPG implementation  is very fast  because the pseudorandom generator  produces   )1(log2 −p  
binary digits in every step.
It is proved that the period of the SSPCG realized by maximum length p-adic FCSR of length L and connection 
integer q is  )1(log2*00 −= pTS , where *0T  is the number of output p-adic FCSR numbers different from 0. 
The  self-shrunken  output  SSPCG  sequence  generated  by  maximum  length  p-adic  FCSR  of  length  L  and 
connection integer q is a balanced sequence.
The  results  from  statistical  analysis  show  that  the  sequence  generated  by  SSPG  is  uniform,  scalable, 
uncompressible and unpredictable.
Improved cryptoanalysis of the Self-shrinking p-adic cryptographic generator
In this section novel results concerning period, linear complexity, and cryptoresistance of SSPCG sequences are 
presented.
First,  we will  remind  that  the  period  of  p-adic  FCSR is  T0 = 2d,  where  the  connection  integer  12 += dq  
[Goresky, Klapper, 2002], and p0 and q are strong p-prime numbers [Xu, 2000]. Since the output sequence of the 
SSPCG is balanced each different from p-its will have
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number of appearances in a period T0. Due to of the fact that there is an exit only in different from 0 p-its, then 
*
0T  acquires the following appearance:

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Then the period of the SSPCG S0 could be found with the help of the following expression:
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From (4) follows that linear complexity has the following value:
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Both the Shrinking Generator and Self-Shrinking Generator use the LFSRs and have a simple structure. Despite 
of this fact no successful cryptanalytic attack for both generators has been published so far.
Due to the nonuniform exit from the SSPCG it is impossible to apply the p-adic Rational Approximation attack 
[Xu, 2000].
All  attacks  acting  against  the  Self-Shrinking  pseudorandom  generator  [Zenner,  Krause,  Lucks,  2001]  are 
unapplicable, due to the fact that they act against the generator constructed by LFSRs.
With a respect of [Zenner, Krause, Lucks, 2001] we recommend the design of the including FCSR to be upper 
than  256  memory  cells  in  order  to  hinder  the  cryptographic  attacks  time-memory-data  and  Backtracking 
Algorithm.
Conclusion
The calculation of the period and the linear complexity of the SSPCG gives an opportunity of more successful 
software realization of this generator due to the greater security, due to using easily generated p-prime numbers. 
The impossibility for attacking the SSPCG with the familiar cryptographic attacks increases the reliability in the 
properties of the generator.
The SSPCG is one example of a nonlinear combining function. The results presented in previous section mostly 
have a straightforward extension to general nonlinear combining functions in algebraic normal form.
On the basis of the simplified design the SSPCG shows properties of a successful candiate as a main or slave 
pseudorandom generator in stream cipher encryption.
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